The Rohingyas, the Arakan Army, the Tatmadaw, and the stabilisation of Rakhine

Rakhine is once again in the international political talks. It is the place from where the Rohingyas were mercilessly thrown out under Tatmadaw's flagship ethnic cleansing project. 

Tatmadaw committed the gravest genocide on an epic scale that brought back the memory and trauma of the Holocaust and Nazi Germany. This time, it is not only one race, but all the minorities living in Myanmar; something that Tatmadaw can't undo.

Tatmadaw has now waged its vicious claws toward its power base – the Buddhist population. It is not only about the Rohingya then; it is about the Burmese citizens who supported the Tatmadaw too. 

The Arakan Army emerged as the vital alternative for the Rakhine population as it fought back the boots. The latest battle between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw is a battle of terminal end – either one must win. 

But what appears to be a fact is that AA has gained a foothold and is on the way to gaining mass support, enough to collectively push Tatmadaw back to its Bamar Heartland. 

Unless Tatmadaw embarks on another genocidal spree, which is not unlikely, AA has every potential to dictate the course of Rakhine's political future. 

What makes AA unique at the moment?

First, AA seems to have assured China, Japan, and Southeast Asia that it will not disrupt international investments. Japan's Special Envoy and much revered Nippon Foundation Chairman Yohei Sasakawa reached out to Tatmadaw and AA in November 2023. 

China brokered talks between the military and the Northern Alliance, popularly known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, in the Chinese city of Kunming in January 2024. It continues to influence the key actors involved in the civil war.  

The US has rolled out the Burma Act that partially aims to politically empower Burmese citizens to return to civilian governance and pursue accountability for human rights violations. 

Very recently, the Arakan Liberation Party, along with representatives of six other ethnic groups, reached an agreement to form a new alliance called the Seven Ethnic Armed Organisation Alliance in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on 19 March 2024. 

Lately, in February 2024, though, India sent a minute delegation led by K Vanlalvena to Myanmar to meet AA members in Paletwa, the pivotal locus for India's Kaladan project. 

That means AA's international rampart is now on display.

Second, Rakhine is strategically situated in the soft belly of the geographical stretch from South to Southeast Asia. Bangladesh can be the only dependable neighbour for the Rakhine population that can provide a humanitarian corridor to mobilise resources to stabilise Rakhine. 

It also shares the Bay of Bengal—an Indo-Pacific geopolitical hotbed in the making—to its East. The Bay is a soft battleground for China and the Western Hemisphere. After the Chinese docking of a survey ship in the Maldives, the Bay has become even more crucial for both superpowers. 

Hence, AA is increasingly becoming caught between a rock and a hard place. 

Third, AA has pledged to build inclusive administration, judiciary, and public security to heal the perennial governance deficits in Rakhine – the second poorest province of Myanmar. 

In this inclusivity, AA has been advocating for a citizenship amendment that would include the expelled Rohingyas as Burmese. While there is always a debate about this commitment, it is at least a beginning, which I assume neither China nor the US would oppose. 

Last but not least, both AA and the Rohingyas bear similar traumas. Both see NUG (National Unity Government of Myanmar) as an extension of the NLD (National League for Democracy) government that called for the Tatmadaw to "crush" AA. 

NLD-Tatmadaw designated AA as a terrorist organisation along with Rohingyas as a non-Burmese population. However, what is encouraging is that NUG woke up to reality and opened its arms to accept AA and the Rohingyas as legitimate entities. 

Once against the ICJ (International Court of Justice) proceedings, the NUG has now become a party to the ICJ testimonies against Tatmadaw's war crimes.

So, what options lie ahead for AA and the Rohingyas?

For AA, it is clear that it will have to work with the Rohingyas if it genuinely intends to offer Rakhine as an inclusive, democratically governed, and peacefully stable destination for trade and investment. 

After all, the ICJ court rulings and international scrutiny of human rights records will not go away. Meanwhile, it would be wise to remember that Tatmadaw's recent move to drag the minority communities into war through conscription rules is nothing but an attempt to deepen polarisation between the Buddhists and other minorities. A colonial way called Divide and Rule.

While a fraction of Rohingyas living in Myanmar can always be forced to be trapped in Tatmadaw's unfolding chaos curse, almost all of the Rohingyas have no reason to follow Tatmadaw's bluff. Rohingyas have often burnt their fingers and cannot afford to be a part of a historic blunder. 

Subsequently, Tatmadaw's misinformation and disinformation campaign to perpetuate the Buddhist-Muslim divide will continue. These whispers should be blown away.

For the Rohingyas, tasks are more complicated. Let me recall history in terse. The 1942 Arakan massacres caused 20,000 Arakanese Buddhists to lose their lives. Rakhine (then Arakan) became the perilous frontline during World War II. 

The war between the colonial armies resulted in a deep, traumatic communal feud followed by a complete breakdown of civil administration and abandonment of the Muslim population. 

The Rakhine discourse often forgets to mention that 40,000 Rohingyas, double the Buddhist casualty, were forced to death, too. 

Since then, communal bad blood has been used by Tatmadaw to control Rakhine's resources and stability. 

I must mention that until 1783, Arakan (Rakhine) was an independent state. Marauk U was conquered by the Bamar-dominated Konbaung dynasty, not by the Rohingya Muslims. Yet the blame game continues.

Shall that continue to persist?

I guess the answer is no. Neither AA nor the Rohingyas should allow themselves to be a bargaining chip. Hence, 2024 is a decisive year for Rakhine to choose which way to go. 

Both Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingyas are now feeling this pressure of time. That means the scope for communal reconciliation and Buddhist-Muslim social integration is possible. The Rohingyas are required to pursue a socio-political policy to stabilise Rakhine. 

The Rohingya leadership and AA should establish solid communication and find ways to build confidence in each other so that Rakhine can become an economic heartland. 

I think neither China nor the Southeast Asian community, and of course, the West, with a sense of responsibility to avoid another humanitarian catastrophe, will oppose such communication. 

I would also recommend the UN and civil society in Bangladesh lend their hands in bridging gaps between the Rakhine Buddhist community and the Rohingyas at home and abroad.

We must work together to ensure a better Bay of Bengal region to see a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Professor Shahab Enam Khan is the Executive Director of the Bangladesh Centre for Indo-Pacific Affairs at Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh