Two years on, where does the Ukraine-Russia war stand?
Two years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the war is far from over. While it continues to shatter the world economy, the course of the war might change after the next US elections
It's been two years since Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South, aiming to gain control over the entire country either through direct military occupation or by installing a proxy government.
The bitter and bloody war ever since has caused widespread destruction, with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) confirming 30,041 civilian casualties as of 6 February this year. This includes 10,382 deaths and an additional 19,659 injuries. The actual number is likely higher.
Also, the war has deepened the divide between Russia and the West, exacerbating economic insecurity worldwide. What's even more alarming is that there seems to be no end to the conflict in sight.
In the latest developments, Ukrainian forces have retreated from the eastern town of Avdiivka, and Russian troops are poised to further advance into the area, making the whole situation as tense as ever.
Elsewhere, pressure on the Kremlin is mounting in the wake of the death of opposition leader Alexey Navalny, while discontent toward Russian President Vladimir Putin within Russian society is also increasing.
However, as of January this year, Putin's approval rate among Russians stood at 85%.
Speculation is circulating that Putin may intensify the military offensive in Ukrainian land in the coming weeks. This move could aim to suppress discontent and bolster his domestic support ahead of Russia's presidential election from 15 to 17 March.
Nevertheless, extending beyond borders, the war over the past two years has caused a notable shift in the global power dynamics.
The international order, predominantly shaped by the United States after World War II, has still remained somewhat intact. Even so, the US has seen its relative influence decline in some areas.
This is due to a combination of factors, including the rise of other powers, domestic political shifts, and changing global attitudes towards American foreign policy since February 2022.
On the flip side, the distribution of global power is undergoing a transformation with the emergence of new powers and influential non-state actors.
The sanctions and the shift to a new world order
To begin with, several global powers including the US, Canada, the UK, European Union, Switzerland, and France have imposed significant sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine.
The US leads the list with 3,585 sanctions against Russia, while Canada and Switzerland have also implemented over 2,000 sanctions each thus far.
These sanctions have targeted Russia's defence and related equipment, technology, metals, mining sectors as well as nearly 12,000 individuals, including Russian oligarchs and members of the government.
Overall, since 22 February 2022, Russia has accumulated a total of 16,587 sanctions, significantly outnumbering the second-ranked Iran, which has faced only 1,395 sanctions during this period.
Certainly, these sanctions have exerted pressure on Russia's economy. JPMorgan's estimates indicated that the Russian economy could contract by 3.5% in 2022, while the World Economic Forum anticipated a significant drop in Russian GDP of 7-8% in 2023.
The long-term repercussions of the war and the sanctions on the Russian economy are still unfolding and are expected to be substantial.
Nonetheless, the sanctions have also led to unintended consequences, such as pushing Russia closer to other major powers, fostering the formation of an unplanned alliance.
As the sanctions limited Russia's access to the global financial system, it dealt a severe blow to their economy, which heavily depends on export revenues and international trade.
Consequently, Russia strengthened its economic ties with countries such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil and Belgium, which have become crucial markets for Russian goods, particularly energy resources.
According to a report by The New York Times on 30 October 2022, Russia's trade with India surged by a massive 310% in the aftermath of the sanctions imposed by the West. There were also significant increases in trade with Turkey (198%), Brazil (106%), and Belgium (81%).
However, the most noteworthy increase was the 64% surge in trade with China, reaching as high as $15 billion.
Additionally, as Russia faced sanctions, it has been increasingly turning to the Chinese yuan (RMB) for transactions. If the trend persists, it has the potential to weaken the US dollar's global position and enhance the yuan's prominence in global financial transactions in the future.
Also, when several Russian banks were banned from the SWIFT system – which facilitates most global money transfers and is crucial for international trade – China's financial infrastructure, including its digital payment systems, emerged as an alternative channel for Russia to conduct cross-border transactions.
And thus, the shifts following the sanctions helped Russia in two major ways.
Firstly, it reshaped the global financial and geopolitical landscape involving both Russia and China, potentially paving the way for a new world order.
Secondly, the trade gains and newfound alliances enabled Russia to generate sufficient revenue to finance the ongoing war efforts.
Will the support for Ukraine continue?
The US, under the Biden administration, has been a major contributor to Ukraine's war efforts.
While Europe may have surpassed the US in terms of economic aid to Ukraine, the US maintains a considerable lead in military support.
According to the US Department of State, the US has provided $44.2 billion in military assistance as of December 2023 since 24 February 2022. In comparison, Germany, the largest European donor, has contributed €18 billion ($19.48 billion approximately) as reported by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Overall, the Joe Biden administration and the US Congress have directed more than $79 billion in assistance to Ukraine, which includes humanitarian, financial, and military support, according to the Kiel Institute.
On 13 February, the US Senate passed the National Security Act of 2024, which, if enacted, would allocate approximately $60 billion for Ukraine-related activities out of a total funding package of $95.3 billion.
Since February 2022, the UK has also pledged almost £12 billion in overall support to Ukraine, of which £7.1 billion ($8.99 billion approximately) is for military assistance. On 12 January this year, the UK government announced a further £2.5 billion ($3.16 billion approximately) of funding for 2024/25.
Meanwhile, the EU has so far contributed over €138 billion ($149.39 billion approximately) to Ukraine since February 2022. Also, on 1 February, EU leaders agreed to set up the Ukraine Facility for the years 2024-2027 to provide stable and predictable financing to Ukraine. The Ukraine Facility is expected to provide up to €50 billion ($54.12 billion approximately) in grants and loans until 2027.
Integrating Ukraine into the European Union could also mean some €186 billion ($201.35 billion approximately) in EU funds flowing to the country over seven years.
However, even after so much support, things do not seem to be going Ukraine's way.
While most Europeans express support for Ukraine in its conflict against Russia, only around 10% believe that Ukraine can emerge victorious, as indicated by a survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
The majority of respondents perceive a "compromise settlement" as necessary to bring an end to the conflict.
Nevertheless, the majority of Ukrainians support fighting until the war is won. In 2022, it was 70%, and last year it was 60%. Another survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology indicates that 58% of Ukrainians think Ukraine should carry on fighting even if the US and other countries were to withdraw their support.
And this brings us to the question whether the US would really withdraw their support from Ukraine in the coming months, or years.
Indeed, if Donald Trump were to be reelected as US President for a second term, there exists a real possibility of such an outcome.
During his previous term, Trump had shown a predisposition to be sympathetic to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In recent interviews, he has also frequently suggested that the US might be providing Ukraine with too much support and criticised American allies for not contributing as much to support Ukraine.
He further expressed concerns about the depletion of US military stockpiles as a result of aid packages sent to Kyiv.
Recently, he even went to the extent of saying that he would encourage Russia to do "whatever the hell they want" to any NATO member country that doesn't meet spending guidelines on defence.
This statement marks a stunning admission that he would not abide by the collective-defence clause at the heart of the alliance if reelected.
Hence, if Trump were indeed to be reelected, it's possible that the US backing for Ukraine could change, with Trump using his executive power to slow down or even halt congressionally approved military aid to Ukraine.
And in that case, it is very much likely that Ukraine could end up losing this war – if not immediately but in the longer term for sure.