Will an Assad-free Syria end up in an Arab winter?
Of all the people who stood up to despots during the Arab Spring, the Syrians have paid the most price. Which raises the question: do the Syrian rebels now have the wherewithal to provide a new beginning to Syrians, or will the country follow its peers down the path of a chilly Arab winter
The great Syrian revolution has moved from the stage of struggle to overthrow the Assad regime, to the struggle to build a Syria together that befits the sacrifices of its people - a powerful statement, issued by a powerful rebel coalition that has finally overthrown the genocidal despot Bashar al-Assad, who waged a brutal war upon his own people under the backing of Russia and Iran.
When protests began in 2011 against the dynastic rule of Al-Assad, it was thought that he would give up fast. He was never the first pick for the Syrian throne (which he got by luck after his elder brother and Hafiz Al-Assad's favourite son's accidental death), and was known to be a soft-spoken and well-mannered person. But, brutality runs in his blood, and a war did he fight.
Sadly, none of the countries that saw popular protests - collectively titled the Arab Spring - transitioned into a democratic or functional state. Neither Egypt nor Tunisia could be the state their people dreamt of; while Libya and Syria lost their sovereignty in reality. But why? Why did the Arab Spring fail? Is it due to 'western conspiracy'? Is it because of Israeli influence? Or are middle eastern countries not suitable for democracy, as some would like to preach?
Sadly, the reason runs deeper. The Middle Eastern countries were created to be perpetually unstable after World War One, and the colonial legacy still lingers. Also, the real answer may be less 'sexy', but crucial nonetheless—weak institutions and economic failure.
Keep updated, follow The Business Standard's Google news channel
You need strong and capable institutions to rebuild a country. But decades of autocratic rule in the Arab world has dismantled institutional frameworks essential for such democratic governance.
Leaders such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria concentrated power within narrow circles, using state institutions primarily to entrench their regimes.
Political parties were either banned or rendered ineffective, while the judiciary and media were co-opted to serve authoritarian interests. This hollowing-out of institutions created a systemic inability to support a democratic transition when these regimes fell.
For example, in Egypt, Mubarak's departure in 2011 revealed the weakness of both civil and political institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood, the best-organized opposition force that was long repressed by Hosni Mubarak, ascended to power quickly but was ill-equipped to govern.
Sadly, the reason runs deeper. The Middle Eastern countries were created to be perpetually unstable after World War One, and the colonial legacy still lingers. Also, the real answer may be less 'sexy', but crucial nonetheless—weak institutions and economic failure
The Brotherhood's inexperience manifested in constitutional overreach and alienation of secular and minority groups. The resulting polarization provided an opening for the military to reassert control in 2013.
In Tunisia, a similar secular vs Islamist conflict ruined the scope of reconciliation and created a united front after Ben-Ali. Thus, the coalition government failed and the country went downhill.
In Libya, Gaddafi's "Jamahiriya" system eliminated the concept of a state bureaucracy. Local committees and revolutionary councils were used to enforce loyalty rather than deliver public services or develop governance expertise.
Following his ouster, Libya descended into chaos as militias, tribal groups, and competing factions filled the void left by the regime's collapse. Efforts to rebuild state institutions were hindered by the absence of shared governance norms and frameworks.
Conflicts between the executive, judiciary, and legislature undermined governance. Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) lacked the legitimacy and capacity to unify disparate factions, resulting in competing centers of power.
Statistical evidence also shows the institutional fragility of many Arab Spring countries. For instance, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for 2010 show that Libya, Yemen, and Syria scored below the 10th percentile for "Rule of Law" and "Government Effectiveness." These structural deficiencies made democratic consolidation almost impossible post-revolution.
In the absence of civilian oversight mechanisms, militaries often stepped in as default power brokers.
This was evident in Egypt, where the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) controlled the transition after Mubarak's ouster and later facilitated the coup against Mohamed Morsi. Military-led governance further sidelined democratic processes, embedding authoritarianism within transitional phases.
Sectarianism played a divisive role in countries like Syria, Iraq, and Libya. In Syria, the Assad regime leveraged Alawite loyalties to consolidate its power base, presenting itself as the protector of minorities against a Sunni-majority opposition. This sectarian framing polarized society, transforming demands for democracy into a sectarian civil war. Libya was divided among competing warlords, who controlled different parts, and gave rise to Islamic terrorism.
Tribalism added another layer of complexity, particularly in Yemen and Libya. In Yemen, the failure of the transitional government under President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to integrate tribal groups into decision-making processes contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 2015. Tribal alliances, such as those supporting the Houthi movement, capitalized on state fragility to expand their influence.
Economic class divisions also hindered unity in post-revolutionary politics. In Tunisia, the relatively prosperous coastal regions saw faster progress in political reforms, compared to the marginalized interior, where economic frustrations persisted. This disparity fueled resentment and skepticism about the democratic process, weakening national cohesion.
The revolution that was born when Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire - which quickly spread out throughout the region - was triggered by an economic crisis. And this crisis was at the crux of Arab Spring protests, But, the crisis was not solved post-revolution.
In Egypt, youth unemployment reached 34% by 2013, significantly higher than the global average of 13%. The International Labour Organization (ILO) noted that the country's labour market had been stagnating for years, with limited job creation in formal sectors.
Similarly, Tunisia's unemployment rate rose even after the revolution, with joblessness particularly acute among university graduates. Unemployment reached 15.4% in 2015. These trends compounded popular frustration with democratic governments, which were perceived as no better than their predecessors in delivering economic relief.
IMF-imposed austerity measures in Tunisia, including subsidy cuts and tax increases, deepened public discontent, undercutting the legitimacy of transitional governments.
Economic inequality persisted, undermining the legitimacy of new governments. For instance, Tunisia, often touted as the Arab Spring's lone success story, saw growing inequality between the capital and peripheral regions. The Gini coefficient for Tunisia increased from 0.43 in 2010 to 0.47 by 2015, reflecting widening disparities.
Oil-exporting countries faced their own challenges. Libya's GDP, heavily reliant on oil, contracted by 62% in 2011 as production facilities were damaged during the uprising. Civil war further disrupted the economy, preventing recovery.
Foreign aid often exacerbated economic problems rather than alleviating them. In Egypt, the conditions attached to IMF loans included subsidy cuts and tax increases, leading to higher living costs for ordinary citizens. The result was widespread dissatisfaction, even as the government received billions in external support.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided substantial support to Egypt after Morsi's ouster, enabling Sisi's military-backed regime to consolidate power.
The Arab Spring failed to manifest its promises; but it was not the fault of the people. The Arab states, ruled by despots and ruthless dictators, never built their countries. They created their own personal empires and used the countries as their piggy banks.
There were indeed foreign interferences, external pressure and if we try to be a bit more imaginative, we will find some foreign conspiracies as well. But in the end, it all boils down to the weak institutions, which let down the economic recovery. And there, the Arab Spring ended in Arab Winter.
Which brings us to Syria. The Syrian economy shrank by more than 60% between 2010 and 2021. The official exchange rate of the Syrian pound declined 50-fold against the dollar between 2011 and 2022.
Before the conflict, Syria's economy was growing at an average of 4.3% annually, driven largely by non-oil sectors. The war reversed this progress, with oil production plummeting from 383,000 barrels per day in 2010 to just 10,000 barrels in 2016.
Infrastructure damage—impacting 27% of housing stock, healthcare, and education—compounded disruptions in economic networks, leaving a fragmented economy dependent on emergency aid.
Throughout 2023, inflation was 137%, resulting in a huge price increase in everyday essentials. According to the UN, an estimated 16.7 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024, up from 15.3 million in need in 2023.
It would appear that of all the people who stood up to despots during the Arab Spring, the Syrians have paid the biggest price. Which raises the question: do the Syrian rebels now have the wherewithal to provide a new beginning to Syrians, or will the country follow its peers down the path of a chilly Arab winter.
