Is Bangladesh setting sail in Westerly Winds?

Caption: Recently, the government of Bangladesh (GOB) denied entry to a sanctioned Russian ship carrying components for Rooppur nuclear power plant. Photo: Collected

Until sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on Russia for their invasion of Ukraine put a spanner in the works, Russo-Bangladesh relations had been steadily gaining momentum. Especially with the  Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) nearing completion.

Initially, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) remained resolute on the loyalty owed to Russia by adopting a neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine war. Policy circles and the press tended to downplay the actions of Putin's army and refrained from making any comments that may offend the Kremlin. 

Bangladesh abstained from voting on the resolution 'deploring Russia for the aggression in Ukraine' along with 35 nations – including Pakistan, China, and India. However, Bangladesh later shifted its position. At this juncture, the Government of Bangladesh sensed siding with the US-led western alliance might be more beneficial than sticking with an 'isolated Russia'. 

Photo: Collected

Bangladesh's vote in the second and third resolutions on Ukraine symbolised a shift in the alignment. On 25 March, 2022, Bangladesh voted on the resolution criticising Russia for the reckless attack on the civilian population; and towed the western line in subsequent deliberations and debates.  

Bangladesh found it safer to stick to the sanctions regime than sympathise with Putin's moves to garner support from the Global South. The government of Bangladesh (GOB) denied entry to the sanctioned Russian ship Ursa Major (Sparta III) carrying components for the nuclear power plant under construction by Rosatom at Rooppur in the northern district of Pabna in Bangladesh. 

GOB adopted a safe route for maintaining the bilateral economic interest with the West by complying with the sanctions. While the Ambassador of Russia in Bangladesh lodged a formal protest for denying entry of the vessel into the Mongla port, the Indians allowed the sanctioned ship to berth at the Haldia port at the mouth of the Hooghly River 124 km southwest of Kolkata. 

The latest reports on Sparta III suggest that the sanctioned ship sailed back to Russia without being able to offload the cargo of the components for the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. Fear of US reprisals compelled the South Asians to send the sanctioned ship back, jeopardising the completion of the RNPP. 

The Indian government's unwillingness to assume any risk for the sake of 'saving a neighbour' has disappointed many observers in Dhaka. India could have taken a bit more interest in facilitating the unloading of the cargo at Haldia port since it involved a relationship with one of its closest allies - Russia. 

The US and the West felt the teeth of the sanctions bite in the deep end of the Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh's energy security was compromised by complying with Western sanctions and putting the completion of the heavily vested nuclear power plant in jeopardy. 

Russia sent the cargo on the Sparta III, confident about a staunch ally willing to assume any risk involved based on mutual interest.  Moscow may have expected Bangladesh to act in accordance with the agreement signed by the two nations' leaders and prioritise the completion of the Rooppur Power Plant to satisfy the urgent demand for electricity. 

The decision of the Bangladesh government to comply with the sanctions seems to suggest the prevention of any disruption of relations with the US has been made top priority, since it would otherwise put at risk the inflow of billion of dollars into the coffers from apparel exports. In weighing the pros and cons, the Government of Bangladesh opted to safeguard the 'dollar earnings' against ensuring 'energy security'. 

Analysis of the political dynamics suggests that the transition from Russia may have been in progress already in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukraine war. The action of the Bangladesh government of sending the ship away without unloading the vital cargo is not a purely economic decision. Political considerations – both domestic and regional stability may have influenced the needle of the compass to be 'aligned' in the Westerly direction. 

On the flip side, the government of Bangladesh could have taken the risk of infringement of sanctions by following the line of defence of India vis-à-vis Western sanctions. However, Dhaka chose not to take any chances with Western sanctions. An insatiable domestic demand served the purpose of Indian government officials in justifying the continuation of the import of Russian oil, despite drawing intense criticism from the West. It is now clear to any outside observer that Bangladesh is more likely to buckle from the external pressure given the risk of dire economic and or political consequences. 

Russia may be bruised by the Bangladesh government's impulsive action, and the latter may have to deal with the long-term consequences. Observers may interpret this as a weakness of Bangladesh diplomacy since it did not protect its short- and long-term interests - at stake. 

On a positive note, compliance with the sanctions put Bangladesh ahead of the nations vying for Western aid and trade. In Dhaka, Donald Lu, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in a moment of utter enthusiasm at a press briefing, overstated facts by referring to the intention of the US government to place 'Bangladesh on top of the list of nations under review for reinstatement of the GSP'.   

Regaining GSP and abiding by sanctions, Bangladesh hopes to bring prosperity to its people and a broader participatory role in international and regional affairs.  

The writer is an international expert with specialisation in Southern Asia and International Human Rights and alumni of Dhaka University Department of International Relations 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.