The fall of Assad: Redefining power, resistance and politics in the Middle East
Assad’s fall is not merely the end of a regime; it is the beginning of a new chapter in the region’s complex and turbulent history
From a grassroots movement for democratic reforms in 2011, the Syrian uprising has now come to an end with the fall of Bashar al-Assad, marking a major turning point for the Middle East. Over the past decade, Syria has been at the centre of the region's geopolitical rivalries, proxy wars, and ideological fights, and Assad's authoritarian rule has been both a manifestation and an epitome of the wider malaise.
It is a profound event with wide-reaching implications across the Middle East, as his ouster, coming after years of civil war, foreign interventions, and wavering international support, is not just the end of an era for Syria; rather, it is the beginning of a new era for the country and the geopolitical environment in the Middle East.
It did not happen as an isolated event. Armed opposition groups, combined with the politicisation of the Syrian state, heralded the decline of the monopoly over power held up until then by the Assad regime. Simultaneously, the geopolitical ambitions of powers like Iran, Russia, and Turkey clashed with each other in Syria, and the country itself was a miniaturised version of the wider 'battle for influence' among regional powers.
The collapse of the Assad regime is importantly a driving factor for different stakeholders for different reasons. It is a key blow, dealing away the last of a strategic pillar for Iran in its 'Axis of Resistance' and decades of investment in Syria as a conduit of influence and a shield against adversaries such as Israel. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are traditional powers that may tap into opportunities to influence post-Assad Syria, while external actors like Russia muddle with the limitations of their interventions.
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Still, the repercussions of Assad's fall stretch well beyond the borders of Syria, disrupting the current order in Iran, Palestine, and the broader Middle East and assessing the degree to which the Israel-Hamas war will alter, provoking new power dynamics in the Middle Eastern region.
The collapse of Iran's geopolitical foothold
For Iran, Syria was far more than an ally; it was a cornerstone of its regional influence. Tehran maintained crucial land and air corridors through Assad's Syria to supply its proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and militant factions in Palestine. The fall of Assad marks the unravelling of this carefully woven geopolitical tapestry, leaving Iran's strategic ambitions in jeopardy.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Damascus has constituted an essential node in Tehran's geopolitical network. This alliance grew stronger during the Syrian Civil War as Iran funnelled billions of dollars and sent thousands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Syria to train and help Syrian forces.
Iran's support for Assad came at an enormous cost, both financially and in terms of human resources. Tehran's support for Assad was not small. It poured billions over four decades into military bases, missile factories, and arms transfers, turning Syria into an indispensable leg of its regional axis. Tehran pumped billions of dollars over the years into sustaining Assad's military, subsidising Syria's collapsing economy, and providing humanitarian aid to government-held areas.
Estimates suggest that Iran spent upwards of more than $30 billion on the Syrian conflict, a figure that strained its economy, already weakened by the US sanctions and internal mismanagement. Beyond finances, Iran's involvement in Syria also cost the lives of hundreds of IRGC commanders and thousands of Iranian-backed militia fighters.
The emergence of non-state actors in Middle Eastern geopolitics
The Assad fall has opened a void in Syria's governance and its territorial control, which non-state actors have quickly filled. These groups, ranging from seasoned militant organisations to newly emergent factions, now command swathes of land that were once under the tight grip of Assad's regime. Their high profile is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose swiftness with the territorial acquisition shows a new dynamic of power in the region.
For regional powers, HTS represents a paradox. Yet their acceptance as legitimate stakeholders, a point I made last week, has been advanced by a rejection of the Assad regime and its Iranian backers; they point to their Islamist ideology and authoritarian tendencies. This raises the broader challenge of incorporating non-state actors into the geopolitical framework of the Middle East.
As Syria's borders dissolve into a patchwork of militant strongholds, the influence of traditional state actors diminishes. Iran, for example, has been unable to roll back HTS activities in key areas, including Aleppo and Homs, provinces with strategic and logistical import for its operations, as it has in other parts of the country. This decline may not only weaken Iran's regional architecture but also embolden HTS and similar groups to expand their influence further into territories traditionally dominated by state actors.
The proliferation of non-state actors is both an opportunity and a threat for both Western nations and Israel. The vagueness of these groups and their capacity to harbour anti-Western sentiment might bring up new security concerns. The international community has the dual challenge of preventing extremist factions from establishing a dominant rule in Syria and preventing the political vacuum left by Assad from spinning into uncontrolled anarchy like that in post-invasion Iraq.
The rise of non-state actors also underscores a broader trend in Middle Eastern geopolitics: the declining importance of the state as the sole power wielder. In Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, armed groups that influence the societies in which they operate now rival or even surpass national governments. This phenomenon is all the more pronounced in the context of Syria's collapse. The lack of a central authority has made such factions as HTS able to provide local and global faces to Middle Eastern politics.
The Palestine factor and Israel's strategic advantage
For the Palestinians, Assad's fall means trouble. The weakening of Iran and Hezbollah means Palestinian militant factions like Hamas may lose crucial backing and are less capable of rebelling against Israeli invasion. With the waning of Tehran's influence in Syria, Hamas, long dependent on material and ideological backing from Iran and its regional allies, including Assad's Syria, has begun to feel increasingly fragile.
Since Syria is no longer a safe conduit by which Iran arms or funds Hamas, their capacity to do deployment work in Gaza will be impacted. Moreover, the fragmentation of the 'Axis of Resistance' undermines the cohesion of Palestinian efforts to achieve statehood and self-determination. Therefore, Hamas may face diverse logistical shortcomings to deter the Israeli military in the coming days.
As a result, Israel is likely to become a strategic beneficiary among the countries in the midst of turmoil in Syria, often remaining silent. The fall of Assad takes down one of Iran's most important regional cards and works to Israel's advantage in securing its own strategic interests.
The instability in Syria further edifies the plight of the Palestinian refugees in the region, most of whom have been displaced many times since the start of the Syrian civil war. The leadership crisis in Hezbollah and Hamas has left both weakened, allowing Israel to feel emboldened to take further steps to marginalise Palestinian resistance movements in Gaza and the West Bank that would only further aggravate the Israeli invasion.
For Israel, this new reality of fragmented power in Syria is one it cannot but consider. However, Iranian proxies have been thumped hard to be replaced by the rise of HTS and other militant Sunni groups. While these factions are in a bustle at the moment, building their advantage in Syria, they may have ideologies that typically include anti-Israel sentiments at some point.
Shifting dynamics of regional order
While Iran faces the unwanted fallout, Turkey is likely to be a significant beneficiary of Assad's downfall. For years, Ankara has been pursuing an assertive foreign policy in northern Syria, stirred by a desire to suppress Kurdish autonomy along its borders and swell its influence in the Levant.
For Saudi Arabia, Assad's collapse presents both risk and opportunity. Riyadh was long opposed to Iranian influence in the region and early backed Syrian opposition groups to weaken Tehran's foothold. In the long run, however, Saudi Arabia adopted a more practical approach, looking to moderate Saudi ties with Syria in an attempt to preclude regional divisions.
Israel, an Assad and Iran foe for a long time, might have mixed upshots. A "victory" for Israeli security interests is the disruption of Iranian supply routes through Syria. As Hezbollah is weakened and Iran's regional network is at sixes and sevens, Israel offers itself breathing space to wed a more assertive geostrategic modus operandi. Since 2015, Russia's involvement in the Middle East has been entangled with its backing of the Assad regime on a global scale. Recent developments may have placed a big hurdle in Russia's path. Now, its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, critical to keeping its presence in the Mediterranean, are vulnerable to rebel advances.
With Assad's fall, new dynamics of regional politics and a new Middle Eastern order are on the horizon. Iran and Russia are on the defensive of traditional power centres, and Turkey and Saudi Arabia might try to take on roles they simply would not have before. Non-state actors, both militant and political, further complicate the milieu, challenging the primacy of state actors in the region.
As the Middle East recalibrates, the consequences of this upheaval will reverberate far beyond Syria's borders. Assad's fall is not merely the end of a regime; it is the beginning of a new chapter in the region's complex and turbulent history.
Kawsar Uddin Mahmud is a researcher at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA). He can be reached at [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.
