Hedging and the reality of the small states: A wakeup call for Bangladesh?

In this second part we focus on the future scenario facing Bangladesh and outline potential responses to deal with the ramifications of increasing instability in the neighbourhood and beyond. In the immediate vicinity we have witnessed an increasing tension among India and China. 

Despite recent disengagement between Indian and Chinese armies and substantial attempts at de-escalation, the longer-term outlook points towards a more competitive approach. This might hinder Bangladesh's traditionally cooperative relations with both the countries. Thus, at the sub-regional level we might be introduced to a stronger opposition to our hedging behaviour.

Let me use Arnold Wolfers' well-known 'house on fire' metaphor, which posits that if any individual who finds themselves in a house on fire would intuitively – sensing a clear threat – feel compelled to run towards the exit. 

Using this metaphor in world politics, the future scenario entails a reality where systemic or global level events take precedence over 'unit level' or 'state level' imperatives. That is to imply that systemic level pressures will take precedence over state's independent choices.

Now let me put some empirical evidence to support the case. Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia showcased hedging behaviour vis-à-vis China and the United States. Despite the 1979 border war, Sino-Vietnamese relations were a mix of 'contentions on disputed territories but cooperation on economics'. 

Germany’s failure to hedge and its lessons for Bangladesh

The Philippines, being a democracy, maintained a treaty alliance with the USA but significantly increased their cooperation with China despite outstanding maritime boundary issues. Similarly, Malaysia maintained a balanced policy with engagement of both the USA and China. 

During Najib's tenure as Prime Minister, he partook in multibillion dollar investment and infrastructure deals with China while being the second Southeast Asian leader after that of Vietnam to be invited by the Trump administration. All these showcase classic hedging behaviour. 

However, as tensions have heated up, we have witnessed a gradual shift in all three cases. Vietnamese and Philippines' shift has been remarkably faster, perhaps owing to the sensitive and urgent nature of the maritime boundary dispute. 

Malaysian shift has been the slowest, perhaps pointing to a lack of urgency in the boundary disputes. This also proves the point that perceptions about the Regional Security Complex in the South China Sea have impacted all three countries.

Moreover, China's recent actions across the Taiwan strait and its penchant for using innovative military solutions to inherently geopolitical issues renders a traditional diplomatic approach lacklustre in its appeal. 

Unlike prior missile tests, this time around, the Chinese military used prior selected areas around the Taiwan strait to conduct missile tests that virtually put the entire self-governing island into a blockade without China officially needing to enforce a blockade. The impact was so significant that Taiwan had to divert its internet through alternative fibre optic connections as some of its existing lanes for fibre optic communication were part of the drill area. 

This is interesting as Taiwan's major economic strength is in terms of its prowess in the semiconductor industry. This was a response to US house speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to the self-governed island that China considers an integral part of its national territory. The geopolitical situation is further complicated by the systemic implications of China's rise vis-à-vis the United States and its potential to emerge as a global power.

Given the gloomy picture of increasing instability at the systemic level/the global level, between a rising power and an entrenched power and its potential ramification on the policy autonomy of Bangladesh, a more comprehensive approach to policy articulation is imminent. 

Similarly at the regional level, increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is bound to draw responses from India. Thus, we see a classic case of gradual erosion of space for hedging behaviour of Bangladesh. 

Increasingly, it will become difficult to engage one power without hurting the interests of the other. What we must remember before venturing into any potential policy choices is that hedging is in effect a balancing act at remaining equidistant from either opposing or bandwagoning any particular actor. 

And the things being balanced are the national interests of major powers and any one of that falling from the carefully choreographed juggling act will inevitably draw negative responses from one or more of the powers with whom we have an interest to maintain intimate and engaged relations.

What then, would a policy approach to this seemingly quagmire of a situation be? Well, there are three potential responses: innovative diplomacy, status-upgradation and a combination of both.

Let us declutter these one by one. The practice of innovative diplomatic approach would entail a potentially innovative foreign policy that is well integrated with the respective academia in their exchange of ideas and would be able to envision a broader approach to bilateral and multilateral foreign policy with global and regional powers without allowing these countries any recourse to pressure tactics against Bangladeshi interest. 

If balancing is the major focus, then diversification of engagement with major powers is a key necessity. This would entail institutional reforms and a vibrant exchange mechanism with academia. As we look to the USA, we see how think tanks and academia are well integrated with traditional modus operandi of the foreign policy decision making nexus. However, policies are only as effective as the status of the respective states themselves. 

The second point I focus on is status upgradation. This basically entails the enhancement of national power. This is to point towards the enhancement of national power to the extent that a country is able to upgrade its status in the foreign policy calculus of the respective powers. 

Natural elements of national power refer to a country's geography, i.e., all features of its geographical existence, its natural resources and its population. Enhancement of wealth, sophisticated usage of such wealth to transform it into deterrent capabilities. 

Even a well-articulated bluff, backed by potential force may also be termed as status upgradation. However, wealth alone does not guarantee power, deterrence alone does not deter enemies and bluff can also backfire.

The third, which I find to be better suited to Bangladesh's longer-term outlook is a combination of both. Given the complexity of problems that we are going to witness and the gradual lessening of space to manoeuvre, Bangladesh requires a combination of all tools at its disposal to find effective policy solutions. 

All aspects of national power including soft power and the engagement of the diaspora community and well-crafted information warfare strategies would be required to provide policy guidance. 

Reforming the foreign policy bureaucracy to allow it to recruit and draw from more specialised International Relations disciplines, engaging academia regularly in an institutionalised exchange mechanism, regular internal strategy and policy reviews and enhancing aspects of the full spectrum of national power would allow us a much needed self-made breathing space to make autonomous policy choices that are solely in the interest of Bangladesh rather than a balancing act of trying to keep all concerned powers happy.

We must remember that in the 51 years of our existence as an independent state our foreign policy bureaucracy has shown remarkable success and maturity in its dealing with complex 'geopolitical googlies'. It is high time we strengthened their hand through a diverse range of measures to allow them to continue to do so for the next 50 years.

Md Tanvir Habib is a lecturer at the department of International Relations, University of Dhaka