It was foretold BRT would lead to traffic chaos. Now IMED confirms
IMED raised critical concerns about the system’s design, questioning whether its dedicated lanes might worsen congestion in non-BRT lanes instead of easing the city’s infamous gridlock
Summary:
- BRT project criticized for poor design and rushed implementation
- Dedicated lanes may worsen traffic congestion in non-BRT lanes
- Project cost increased by 109%, with 275% time extension
- Experts raised early warnings, but their advice was ignored
- Consultants withdrew over disagreements on technical and design issues
The Dhaka Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project, stretching from Dhaka airport to Gazipur, was heralded as a solution to the city's ever-worsening traffic woes. Yet, it stands today as a testament to poor design, hasty decision-making, and a glaring example of how good intentions can go astray when experts' opinion and proper planning are ignored.
The Dhaka BRT project seems increasingly questionable as fresh doubts emerge – not just from experts but also from the government's own Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED).
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In a recent report, IMED raised critical concerns about the system's design, questioning whether its dedicated lanes might worsen congestion in non-BRT lanes instead of easing the city's infamous gridlock.
"Once fully launched, the dedicated lanes are likely to increase traffic congestion in other lanes, leading to increased public suffering, not solving it," reads the report, released on 23 December.
At a cost of Tk4,268 crore, the project has faced criticism since its inception. Experts, including consultancy firms, raised red flags early on, warning that the infrastructure and operational framework required for a successful BRT system were glaringly absent in Dhaka.
Despite this, a section of overzealous bureaucrats and politicians pushed the project through, driven by the allure of quick solutions and political mileage, according to experts.
Md Shamsul Hoque, a professor of civil engineering at Buet and once a consultant for the project, said adding dedicated lanes for buses will not resolve the traffic congestion.
"The BRT system is unlikely to be sustainable. The necessary infrastructure and operational framework don't exist here. The hasty creation of elevated roads has compromised the entire corridor."
"Bureaucrats forced the project through, but they are not held accountable for their mistakes. Their errors could lead to severe consequences in the transport sector, and this is a serious concern."
Hoque's critique extends beyond design flaws to the culture of accountability. "Bureaucrats forced the project through, but they are not held accountable for their mistakes. Their errors could lead to severe consequences in the transport sector," he warned.
However, Md Moniruzzaman, managing director of Dhaka BRT Company Limited, dismissed the criticisms as premature. "IMED's report is speculative," he said, asserting that the true impact of the BRT could only be assessed once the system is operational.
Moniruzzaman pointed to examples like Mirpur's metro rail, which led to reduced traffic congestion as passenger numbers shifted.
"When the BRT project was initially proposed, experts supported it, and the media did not oppose it," Moniruzzaman argued.
He added that the government could reallocate the dedicated lanes for other vehicles if the BRT system fails - a prospect that raises more questions than it answers about the foresight of this massive undertaking.
The Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation on 16 December launched its services with 10 buses on the 97.43% complete BRT route. Currently other vehicles share the lanes. The project is expected to fully operate by December this year, when the dedicated lanes will be exclusively reserved for BRT buses.
Early warnings
Professor Shamsul Hoque said Buet and India's CEPT University as consultants spent nearly two years trying to convince BRT authorities of the potential consequences.
Eventually, Buet and CEPT, despite having prior experience with successful BRT systems in India, withdrew from the project, he said.
He added that development partners are also accountable, as they often push loans based on Bangladesh's credit rating without understanding the ground realities.
"The Asian Development Bank, which facilitated the loan, should have understood the flaw, but their sole focus was on disbursing funds," he said.
Besides, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways may have constructed the infrastructure, but they lack experience in public transport operations, which is a critical aspect, he added.
M Shafiqul Islam, former managing director of Dhaka BRT Company, said Buet and CEPT withdrew from the project due to disagreements with the Australian consultancy firm SMEC, primarily concerning the future transport model.
He said the issue was a technical matter.
275% time extension
The BRT-3 project, aimed at ensuring smooth, fast, and smoother travel for commuters between Dhaka and Gazipur, was initiated in 2011.
The project is financed jointly by the Asian Development Bank, French donor agency AFD, Global Environment Facility, and the Government of Bangladesh. It includes the construction of a 10-lane Tongi Bridge and flyovers at key locations.
However, despite the work starting in 2012, the full implementation of this project was delayed, with nearly 12 years passing without completion.
The IMED's report points out that delays were caused by the contractors' negligence in hiring sufficient staff and equipment as well as insufficient supervision by the project authorities.
The implementation of the project involves multiple agencies, including the Roads and Highways Department (RHD), the Bangladesh Bridge Authority (BBA), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), and the Dhaka BRT Company.
The RHD is responsible for 16km of road development, BRT lanes, six flyovers, 25 BRT stations, and two terminals, with an overall progress of 97.69%.
The BBA is handling road development, 4.5km of elevated BRT lanes, and the Tongi Bridge, with a progress of 96.57%. LGED has completed feeder roads and the BRT bus depot in Gazipur, with a 100% progress.
The total cost of the project was initially estimated at Tk2,040 crore, with completion expected in 2016. However, according to the IMED report, the project's cost has increased by 109%, and its timeline has been extended by 275%.
As of December 2024, the project deadline has been extended to December 2025.
The report cites several reasons for the delay, including the damage caused to 13 BRT stations during protests in July-August 2023, requiring additional repair work.
Furthermore, the installation of metal fencing between BRT and non-BRT lanes is expected to take another three months. The procurement of 137 specialised buses for the BRT system has also not been completed.
Additionally, the IMED report highlights that due to administrative delays in approving variations in the construction work, the financial progress of the project has come to a halt.
The contractors have not been paid, which has resulted in further delays. This has raised concerns about whether the project will be completed on time.
