Why it is so difficult to institute meaningful reforms

Student movement leader turned adviser to the interim government Md Nahid Islam recently reiterated that the national elections will be held after all necessary reforms are made. 

Around the same time, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir said their party wants the election to be held as quickly as possible, and added that only elected governments can make reforms.

Replying to the accusation that BNP hastily wants election to be in power, Fakhrul said they indeed do politics to get elected and be in power.

A fair statement, but one might construe this as an indication that the party is against reforms, despite the BNP saying that they have always been demanding change. It is easy to imagine that political parties do not want institutional reforms when they are in power, so they can abuse it and amass illegal wealth, just as the Awami League regime had done.

What is interesting to note is that traditional political parties are not the only entities that are resistant to meaningful reforms.

Just a few days back, as joint forces evicted illegal shopkeepers occupying footpaths and parts of roads, one shopkeeper said to journalists: in normal situations, 'godfathers' who live off the extortion money would have managed these situations. But since there are no godfathers now, they have to move their shops. The traders hoped that when an election is held and an elected government is in power, the godfathers will come back, and their problem will be solved.

Rickshaw pullers appear to be on the same boat. They like to ply the roads on whatever side or lane they please, with a little help from the police. A couple of rickshaw pullers I spoke to became furious when I asked them about having to maintain traffic laws. With the police having lost their moral (or immoral) high ground since the bloodbath in July, rickshaw pullers are now desperate. 

Whether it be hawkers on the streets, unruly rickshaw or bus drivers, or roadside vegetable vendors of Karwan Bazar — all of them used to pay extortion money to ruling party men, as well as the police, to get away with their illegal acts. These have been reported on in the media for a long time, but nothing changed. 

In theory, a reform of the institutions, such as the police force, would mean the members of the police would not engage in extortion on the streets, nor would they allow ruling party extortionists to commit the same crime. 

As such, it will not just be the extortionists who are enraged by this change; recent events in New Market and Karwan Bazar clearly show that the small traders also strongly resist change. I do not think we need to mention corrupt big corporations and rent-seekers here. This is why real, lasting reform is not sought by many. 

It is easy for the interim government to make the necessary changes to the police, administration and Election Commission to hold a free and fair election and handover power to the next government. But can the institutional reforms sustain through the next political governments?

A discussion on the proposed police commission can help answer this question.

The tenure of the 2007-08 army-backed caretaker government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed had taken an initiative to set up the National Police Commission to free the police from politicisation by partisan government(s).

The commission would make recommendations regarding appointment of the police chief and posting of other high ranking officials. As per the draft law, it would consist of 11 members, including four lawmakers — two each from the ruling party and the opposition – and four non-political independent members.

The draft law also proposed the formation of a Police Complaints Commission, to be led by a retired judge of the Appellate Division, to deal with serious complaints against law enforcers and make them more accountable to the people.

The idea seems solid on paper. The problem is, how do we make sure that the ruling party will not fill up the commission with people of its liking, especially the non-political 'independent' members? There are always enough members in the civil society of the country who will serve the ruling party.  In the past, we have seen similar attempts to engineer the caretaker government by superseding Supreme Court judges.

Even the recently dissolved Election Commission was filled with party loyalists. A commission is independent according to the provisions of the constitution, but the provisions cannot stop anyone from populating it with people who will not work against the party's interest.

And of course, there is the question of whether elected governments will implement the proposed reforms. Hasina, for example, ditched the police commission idea after coming to power in 2008 with promises to depoliticise the police, along with other institutions.

Similarly, while the interim government is perfectly capable of holding a free and fair election with the help of the armed forces and reorganised civil service, the question remains regarding the fate of the next election under a political leadership.

Also, under what arrangement will the elections be held in the future? Will the elected political party be interested in bringing back the caretaker government (which too is corruptible in certain cases)?

Although there have been review petitions challenging the Supreme Court's 2011 verdict that scrapped the non-party caretaker government system, it is not yet clear if the BNP will want it back this time. Its leaders such as Mirza Abbas have criticised the interim government over its initiatives to reform the Constitution. He said that the Constitution can only be amended in the parliament by an elected government. This statement can also be interpreted as reluctance towards restoring the caretaker government system.

Likewise, there are many reform ideas such as limited terms of an individual as head of government, which are likely to face resistance from dynastic political parties.

But there is a way.

When the quota reform movement staged by the students turned into a mass uprising against the corrupt regime led by Sheikh Hasina, expectations kept rising. It was seen as a unique opportunity to reform every aspect of the state.

Despite all the disappointments centering the sustainability — or even possibility — of reforms, fresh aspirations of the younger generation for real change can be the driving force of the reform processes.

It looks like the mass people of the country need to continue to stand vigilant all the time and remain organised — the way they led to the Hasina regime's fall — to foil any effort to reverse the reforms. If this can be ensured, the political parties — traditional and newly formed — will eventually understand that the old ways of running state affairs need to go.