A public history project: Anecdotes from the Afghan crisis

What we lost in our discourse of Afghanistan is history. We do that deliberately. It's painful for some, it's humiliating for others, and for many, it's a reminder of a bitter truth.

The Afghans are a critical reminder of the history of bitter memory, an emotional ethnicity, clan integrity and racial power that you just cannot get from the most basic discourse in the public domain. If we take the Taliban as not Afghans, then perhaps we will be making a mistake. At least, the forgotten history would compel us to see the Taliban as Afghans, not as a separate identity. 

Let's try to find the answer here.

After the Muslim invasion of Sindh led by an Umayyad General Muhammad bin Qassim, the Afghans, ruled by the Ghurid Kingdom, accentuated their imperial spree to invade India. The Ghurid King Muhammad Ghori sent his General Qutb al-Din Aibak for the quest, which later he transformed into Lahore-Delhi Sultanate and ruled between 1206 to 1210. This Afghan imperial territorial map under Muhammad Ghori spanned from Afghan-Iran borders to Bengal.

But for Aibak, the Lahore-Delhi Sultanate was the first initiative to form what we now understand as an east-west axis of India or the Indian subcontinent. It spanned between the Indus and the Ganges. While Aibak was a subject to Ghori royalty, he formed the Mamluk dynasty paving the way for Muslim rule in India. 

The Khiljis, born with Turko-Afghan heritage, came to power in Delhi after the fall of the Mamluks in 1290. The Khiljis were replaced by the Tughlaqs, the dynasty formed by Ghias al-Din Tughlaq, with ethnic roots mixed with Afghan-Turko-Indian ethnicity. 

The 300 years of the Afghan imperial trail ended with the fall of the Sayyid dynasty that succeeded the Tughlaqs in 1415 that lasted for less than four decades. The Afghan rule established Indo-Muslim nobility and waves of Muslim conquests deep into political, social and economic systems in the Indian subcontinent.

Interestingly, the Muslim rulers, being the minorities, successfully exerted their power over the majoritarian non-Muslim populace for three centuries. The first waves of Muslim dynasties allowed inclusivity and tolerance, without which, minority rule would have been difficult in a vast geographical territory like India. 

Their ideology allowed Razia al-Din to reign the Sultanate from 1236 to 1240 as India's first female Muslim ruler. The Ilyas Shahi dynasty, as the first independent Muslim Sultanate of Bengal, was formed in 1338.

The founder of the dynasty Haji Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah, with ancestral origin from the Sistan region of Afghanistan, declared the independence of Bengal from Lucknowti. The dynasty later addressed themselves as Bengali Sultans (Shah Bangaliana as inscribed in their coins and inscriptions) as a part of their social and cultural assimilation. 

Non-Muslim local elites dominated the courts, as evident from the rise of Raja Ganesha during the period of Sultan Shamsuddin Ahmed Shah. Hence, a shared power system existed in the local courts and the military.

The proximity between the rulers and the locals in the Afghan power centers such as Herat, Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Lahore, Delhi, Lucknowti, Sadgaon and Sonargaon allowed the growth of law, education, culture, literature, language and architecture during the medieval period. 

Thus, the Afghans stand on a long heritage of ruling a vast land representing different demography, political cultures, changing geopolitical and geo-cultural atmospheres. It means they were able to adopt different strategies required for different political ecosystems until the fall of the Sayyids, followed by the Lodi dynasty in the hand of Prince Babar.

Shahab Enam Khan and Nurul Kabir

The Mughal dynasty, founded by Chagatai-Turkic prince Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babar, came with a new cartographic agenda. Babar was a descendant of the Turkic conqueror Tamerlane on his father's side and second son of the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan on his mother's side. 

By then, Tamerlane's military caused an invasion to the southern part of Afghanistan that witnessed a slaughtering of an estimated 17 million people and thousands of enslavements of men and women. Tamerlane formed an alliance with the Uzbeks, Hazaras and other Turkic communities in the north to launch campaigns against the Ottomans.

Tamerlane's son's desire to capture Delhi, as he states in his memoir titled "Baburnama," started from Kabul. Babar failed his campaigns in Samarkand several times and settled in Kabul in 1504 when his uncle, Mirza Ulugh Beg, had died in 1501. Babar occupied Kabul in 1504 and waited in Kabul till 1526 to invade Delhi with a military composed of Afghan soldiers. This time Uzbek and Tajik soldiers were added to the defense units.

The rise of the Mughals is the defining moment when Afghan political homogeneity became challenged. The loss of absolutism was perceived as a humiliation by Sher Shah Suri, born as Farid Khan with Afghan ethnicity, who founded the Suri Empire from Sasaram in Bihar, India. It was an act of retaliation against the Mughals. He took control of the Mughal empire, albeit briefly. He extended the existing Grand Trunk Road from Chittagong in the frontiers of the province of Bengal (now Bangladesh), to Kabul in Afghanistan and established a centralised government.

In the next era of Indo-Afghan history, particularly in the post-Mughal centuries, no part of Afghanistan came under the direct rule of any external power. 

In 1837, the Battle of Jamrud was fought between the Sikhs led by Maharaja Rajit Singh and the Afghans under Amir Dost Muhammad Khan. Though the battle's origin can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries between Islamic Durrani Empire and the Sikh Empire, the last episode resulted in inconclusive output.

In 1839, the East India Company sent 18,000 troops to Afghanistan, then known as Khurasan, to oust tsarist Russian accomplice Dost Mohammad Khan. Unfortunately, only one single personnel, Dr. William Brydon, returned from the Afghan mayhem. I wonder why he was spared. Maybe he was just an innocent doctor! 

As William Dalrymple in his Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan aptly told that Khurasan was less a nation as understood by the British than a conglomeration of tribes, often hostile to each other, with little in common but loathing of "foreign infidels." The Khurasan was then either governed by two great families – the Sadozais headed by Shah Shuja, and the Barakzais led by Dost Khan.

The second Anglo-Afghan war between 1878 and 1880 resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak, and British withdrawal from Afghanistan marked a key historic event for international politics. This military conflict was part of the great game between the British and Russian empires, eventually making Afghanistan as a buffer zone between two imperial powers. 

Hence, Afghanistan is a critical factor in defining global military politics in the subsequent years.

The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, known as the War of Independence, was technically a strategic victory for the British empire, for it successfully implemented the Durand Line, which had long been a contentious issue between Afghanistan and the British Raj. 

However, London stopped arms sales to Afghanistan by then. The British empire's influence continued to erode in the Indian-Burmese front. The Afghans were, in any case, exerting control of their external affairs and aspiring to become a functionally sovereign state.

The independence of Afghanistan allowed the post-Bolshevik Soviet Union (now Russia) to reach out to King Amanullah to form a permanent friendship. 

Vladimir Lenin signed a friendship treaty with King Amanullah in 1921, which made the UK worried about revolutionary influence and invasions aimed towards British India. As a result, the Soviets became a major power factor in Kabul, including in political and military spheres. Thus, Soviet-Afghan ties continued to grow after the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947. 

At this moment in international politics, the Cold War unfolded as a geopolitical reality.

Meanwhile, Zahir Shah was installed as the King in 1933 and appointed Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan as the Royal Prime Minister in 1953. Being an ardent nationalist, Daoud Khan had rejected the Durand Line, which was accepted by successive Afghan regimes. He had a hardcore belief in reunification of the Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which resulted in conflict in Bajaur in 1961 with Pakistan. 

This created political suspicion in the newly created Pakistan. Furthermore, Daoud Khan's autocratic rule became divisive, causing ethnic segregation among non-Pashtun populations, particularly among the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara. Hence, Kabul became disproportionately represented by the Pashtuns as the dominant group.

Daoud Khan was not keen on King Zahir Shah's constitutional monarchy. Hence, he planned an army-backed and pro-Soviet minority political party People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)-backed 'rebellion', which seized power from the King in a peaceful coup. 

Thus, once again, Afghanistan saw a rebellion against its monarchy. This time, instead of flowing with history, Daoud Khan proclaimed himself as President, instead of Shah. However, the Muscovites would often call him the Red Prince.

During Shah-Khan's time, the Soviet-Afghan defence ties kept growing. Kabul became a playground for Soviet defence, technology, and nuclear advisers and specialists. They began to explore the energy resources from the 1950s, and in fact, the Afghan gas export to Russia kicked off in 1968. Moreover, Daoud Khan's Pashtunistan-Balochistan projects and pro-Moscow tilt pushed the USSR-USA to see Af-Pak through the geostrategic window. 

However, Khan became ambitious and allowed a NATO presence in northern Afghanistan. In 1977, Leonid Brezhnev, at a state meeting in Moscow, warned Khan regarding NATO presence and asked him to maintain a non-aligned position. This was an ego issue for Khan. Upon returning to Kabul, Khan took the hard policy to reduce ties with the Soviets by increasing its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. 

The PDPA that backed Khan became divided, and one of its top leaders Mir Akbar Khyber was assassinated on 17 April 1978. The other leader of PDPA, Mohammad Taraki, and the Kabul intelligentsia held Khan and his administration responsible for this assassination. 

During the funeral of Khyber, a mass protest broke out, top leaders including Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin were arrested. The Saur Revolution of Afghanistan began. Khan and most of his family were killed at the presidential palace by military officers supporting the PDPA. 

Hafizullah Amin announced the call for the revolution at a press conference in New York in June 1978. The Radio Afghanistan announced: "For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, despotism, and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended, and all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan." 

The pro-Soviet Nur Muhammad Taraki was sworn in as President. The Soviet-Indian support during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 further added geopolitical compulsion for the West, the US, and China to be even more hardliner regarding Afghan politics and uprising. Thus, the Saur revolution became the defining pretext of the next five decades of Afghan history. 

Taraki initiated radical, unpopular reforms and created a deep feud within the party. The rivalries between Khalqists and the Parchamites severed to a level that Hafizullah Amin allegedly ordered the assassination of Taraki. 

This assassination soured the relationship between Kabul and Moscow. Moscow suspected Amin, who had lived in the US, switched sides to the US. Brezhnev ordered Operation Storm 333, composed of the Soviet Army and KGB, to oust Amin to install Soviet loyalist Babrak Karmal. The KGB killed Amin, and the Soviet 40th Army stayed back in Afghanistan. 

But Babrak Karmal was unable to control the situation, and the public uprising resisted the Soviet intervention. The Soviet troops were drawn into battles and conflicts against guerilla warfare, tribal armies, and mutineers from Afghan army units. 

The Soviet intervention, now transformed into War and has taken a new shape. Afghans formed Mujahideens, aided by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Egypt, the People's Republic of China, and others, to resist communism and defeat the Soviets.

The War between 1979 and 1989 continued with Moscow's high military expenditure and dented international relations. The US viewed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as an integral part of the Cold War struggle, which prompted the CIA to support all the anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani intelligence services. 

Moreover, the US-Pakistan alliance allowed the Pakistani territory of North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), gateway to Khyber and Bolan Passes, to rise as a central hub for the Deobandi theologists to wage Afghan Jihad against the atheist communist forces. 

In between, the US president Ronald Regan met a group of six Afghans under the sponsorship of various private groups during the massacre of 105 Afghan villagers in Lowgar Province in September 1982. The group consisted of Mir Ne' Matollah Syyed Mortaza, Habib-Ur-Rehman Hashemi, and Gol-Mohammad, who were villagers from Lowgar Province, Omar Babrakzai, a former judge, Mohammad Suafoor Yousofzai, a resistance leader, and Farida Ahmadi, who was a medical student in Kabul.

The Mujahideens were a composite entity of seven different traditionalist and Islamist groups. The Islamist group was led by a Persian-speaking Tajik ethnic professor of theology at Kabul University Burhanuddin Rabbani and his aides Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Both received Western support. The other two group leaders, Yunus Khalis, a Pashtun by origin, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf were ardent believers of Saudi Wahhabism. 

The traditionalist Mujahideens were a mix of Pashtun and Sufi trends, including Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Sibghatullah Mojaddesi, or Sayid Ahmad Gilani. The Haqqaniya Madrasa played a key role for the Mujahideens. Arab money and foot soldiers started to flow to resist the communist ideologies, expressing solidarity with devasted Muslim livelihoods, and along came one notably wealthy young Saudi  – Osama bin Laden

Osama's Arab- Afghan group eventually evolved into al-Qaeda, then al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). While Osama emerged as a financier and a rebel leader, Afghan guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, was central to much of the anti-Soviet resistance and struggled with others to create a post-Soviet Afghanistan. 

Thus, during the ten years of post-Saur revolution, Soviet War in Afghanistan gave birth to a diverse range of foreign supported groups conflicting with each other. That means the War generated a diverse group of rebels, ethnic armed groups, and militant groups fighting for their survival. Hence, the history of Machiavellian deception and the politics of betrayal continued. 

During the brutal nine-year conflict, approximately a million civilians were killed, around 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan troops, and 14,500 Soviet soldiers, leaving Afghanistan in a perennial political vacuum.

The Soviet War in Afghanistan continued when Perestroika and Glasnost became realities in Mikhail Gorbachev's Moscow. The War was too expensive to continue. The Soviet Politburo supported Gorbachev in withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. 

Moscow worked with Mohammad Najibullah to mend the relationship between the Mujahideen groups, ethnic groups, rebel fractions; it signalled Washington that Moscow is willing to leave Kabul and consolidate power around Najibullah. 

Accordingly, a tripartite accord was signed between USSR, Pakistan, and Afghanistan on 14 April 1988 to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, which commenced on 15 February 1989. 

The Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan following a tripartite accord signed between the USSR, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. PHOTO: REUTERS

The Soviet withdrawal didn't end on a happy note. The security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate under the Najibullah government, primarily due to disagreements within the Soviet agencies. 

Although the Soviet intelligence and political branches were convinced that it was essential to remove Ahmad Shah Massoud for the Najibullah government's stability, the Soviet military established a ceasefire and military deal with Massoud. Nevertheless, the military experience for the Soviets against Massoud in the Panjshir Valley in Northern Afghanistan was bitter. 

The Valley, which remains a critical strategic location, lies 70km north of Kabul between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Salang pass. This connects Kabul to northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. 

The Soviets launched nine offensives against Massoud's mujahideen without much success. The Valley turned into a guerilla foothold that severely restricted supplies of the 40th Army. That too prompted Gorbachev to follow intelligence advice, which, in turn, further fueled anti-Najibullah and anti-Soviet sentiments. 

Gorbachev simultaneously pursued the withdrawal of troops and carried out Operation Typhoon in 1989 to remove Massoud. The KGB was unsuccessful in eliminating Massoud. 

However, Soviet support for the Najibullah government continued after the withdrawal of troops through fiscal aid, military hardware, and technologies. But with the support of the external forces, the mujahideen were able to take control of several cities and oust Najibullah in the spring of 1992. 

By the time Najibullah was expelled, the USSR collapsed and became the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin, and Afghanistan stopped receiving aid from Moscow. PDPA (renamed as Hizb-i-watan), the Afghan armed forces, and the civil administration practically ceased functioning after years of war, desertion, internal struggles, and ultimately cessation of Russian aid and technical support. 

Following the fall of Najibullah in 1992, Ahmad Shah Massoud and his ally Sayyid Mansoor's Ismaili troops and Abdur Rashid Dostum's forces captured the significant air force base Bagram in Kabul. 

However, Massoud refused to enter Kabul as head of the state until a peaceful political settlement is chalked out among all the parties by senior political leaders in exile in Peshawar, Pakistan. Finally, an agreement was reached, known as the Peshawar Accord, which made Burhanuddin Rabbani president and Massoud minister of defence and established the country as the Islamic State of Afghanistan. 

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar disagreed with the Accord and decided to advance towards Kabul from the south along with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf from the west and Hizb-e Islami Khalis from the east. 

At that point, Osama bin Laden attempted to mediate between Hekmatyar and Massoud and urged Hekmatyar to compromise. However, Osama had a personal dislike for Massoud due to strong ideological and political differences. 

Hence, the War over Kabul continued between 1992 and 1996. Hekmatyar's rocket led to violent conflict between militias – Ittihad and Wahdat. Eventually, it ended with the complete collapse of the law-and-order situation.

Kabul witnessed multiple fractions – Shiíte backed, and Sunni-Wahabi backed competitors. The Shi'ite Hazaras supported Hezb-I Wahdat of Abdul Ali Mazari, Sunni Pashtuns backed Ittihad-I Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Uzbeks helped Junbish-I Milli of Abdul Rashid Dostum while Dostum continued to change his loyalty. This despotic situation perpetuated civil War between all these groups leaving the country in a dire situation. At the same time, around 1994, a group called Taliban, largely consisted of Madrasa-based students (Talibs) joined the Civil War from the Pashtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. 

The Taliban's leader Mollah Mohammad Omar spearheaded the rise of the Talib movement with a public commitment to end the civil war and restore stability in Afghanistan. As a result, Kandahar became the centre of power for the Taliban. 

While he focused on the old Pashtun doctrine that Daoud Khan once pursued, Mollah Omar introduced Deobandhi-dominant Shariah law to enforce the Taliban version of governance. He then shifted away from the Peshawar Accord and declared Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 

The Taliban, which we refer to as Taliban 1.0 ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001, came with a mixed bag of politics of Shariah law based on Deobandi fundamentalism, militancy, and Pashtunwali dominance of the Pashtun tribe at the cost of other ethnic groups. 

Once again, ethnic divisions continued. But the caveat here is that the Taliban were able to extend their influence due to two significant reasons swiftly: Afghans were weary of the mujahideen infights that had left Kabul devastated, and the Taliban came with a popular mandate of reunification and tackle lawlessness. By 1995 they captured Herat bordering Iran. In 1996, they captured Kabul, which was in an absolute mess due to multiple factions fighting each other. 

Rabbani was overthrown, and by 1998, almost 90% of Afghanistan came under the control of the Taliban. The Taliban undertook a heavy-handed approach to consolidate its power. Once again, the repressive and totalitarian regime returned by 1998-99, human rights became suppressed, misinterpretation of Sharia law was widely reported, and cultural heritage that we discussed earlier began to erode.

 Hence, the Taliban rule marked the end of once culturally rich territory by 2001 with the destruction of the famous Bamiyan Buddha statues in central Afghanistan. Mollah Omar grew closer tie with Osama, for which in 1999, the United Nations imposed sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 on the Taliban and the Al Qaeda.

Ahmad Shah Massoud adopted a strategy of domestic military resistance and global diplomatic pressure to keep the Taliban on their toes. Photo: Collected

Ahmad Shah Massoud had a strong disagreement with the Taliban on the fundamentals of governance. Massoud formed the Northern Alliance with Abdul Rashid Dostum, Abdul Haq, and Haji Abdul Qadir, creating Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara-Pashtun resistance against the Taliban. 

While most others failed to resist the Taliban, Massoud succeeded as the only key anti-Taliban leader. Counter to the Taliban, he allowed women's rights, female education, and personally intervened against forced marriages within his territory. 

Afghanistan then presented two different models of governance. Pepe Escobar, in his book, Massoud: From Warrior to Statesman, noted, "Massoud says that "the cultural environment of the country suffocates women. But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression."

Being unable to dislodge Massoud, the Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud the prime minister's position to make him stop his resistance, which Massoud declined. Instead, Massoud adopted a strategy of domestic military resistance and global diplomatic pressure to keep the Taliban on their toes. 

Moreover, popular resentment against the Taliban was mounting from the grassroots and international community. Massoud spoke at the European Parliament in Strasbourg and warned the Europeans about Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, just months before the September 11 terror attacks in the US.

The personal animosity of Osama and Al Qaeda naturally targeted Massoud to be assassinated, which would ensure the complete control of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This coincided with AQ's grand strategy to create an Islamic empire in the Indian subcontinent in line with the old Delhi Sultanate and beyond. 

This coincided with the ideologies pursued by the Taliban 1.0 under Mollah Omar and Osama under AQ. Both are long gone. Massoud was assassinated just two days before the 11 September (9/11) attacks on the US, changing post-Cold War history. 

The 9/11 attacks prompted the US to launch assaults on Afghanistan with British support to dismantle the Taliban regime and capture Osama. The US invasion, known as Operation Enduring Freedom, kicked off on 7 October 2001, when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama. 

Indeed, the Taliban asked for proof from the Bush administration regarding Osama's connection with the 9/11 attacks and later sought negotiation. The Bush administration rejected both. The invasion involved US special forces, the Northern Alliance, and the ethnic Pashtun and anti-Taliban forces.

The Taliban 1.0 was weak in any case, very much like the 1992-1996 regime, and the US invasion toppled them within a couple of months. The US and its allies installed a new interim government, headed by Hamid Karzai in December 2001 through the Bonn Agreement 2001. 

According to the Bonn Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 facilitated the formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to remain operational in Afghanistan with primary goals to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), provide support to the Afghan government to rebuild the critical government infrastructure, and carry out campaigns against the Taliban insurgency.

A new constitution was adopted modelled after the 1960s constitution adopted by the last King, Zahir Shah. Despite the new constitution and the transition in 2001, the situation improved relatively. 

However, the socio-political situation remained chaotic for two key reasons: corruption and high ethnic polarisation that was not suitable for the Western top-down "nation-building" and "democracy" projects. 

The Karzai government came to power with the US-backed idea of a "state-first" process in which military power to stabilise Afghanistan was a priority, along with infrastructure building that has an astronomical cost. 

Forbes estimated more than $2 trillion had been spent in 20 years on the War in Afghanistan, that's pretty much 300 million dollars per day, every day, for two decades, or $50,000 for each of Afghanistan's 40 million people. 

That assumed that the mission would be accomplished once the US had established military power and set up the institution of Kabul-Washington's choice. 

Afghanistan required a functional state and operational government for sure, but the Afghans are different! The approach was dead wrong for a deeply heterogeneous country that evolves around orthodox social capital and fabric and customs and norms. 

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2016 indicated that the Governments in Kabul remained plagued with corruption. This has "significantly undermined the US mission in Afghanistan by damaging the legitimacy of the Afghan government, strengthening popular support for the insurgency, and channelling material resources to insurgent groups". 

That means, the warlords and the Kabul elites continued to be on the receiving end of political benefits, once again the periphery remained out of the power fulcrum. 

It was inevitable for the Afghan population to perceive the US presence as a foreign operation intended to weaken their society. By 2006, the toppled Taliban had regrouped and mobilised fighters in its battle against foreign occupiers and its allies. 

Over the next decade, the Taliban leadership went through a transformation. The Gulf country Qatar became the go-to mediator with the Taliban 2.0. The Taliban were invited to attend the "Peace and Security in Afghanistan", known as Doha Dialogue, hosted by the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Pugwash Conferences on Sciences and World Affairs in January 2016. The Taliban were already in peace talks with the Ghani government in Afghanistan, the US administration, China, and Pakistan. 

All the talks made the Taliban well confident that the domestic politics can be well tackled by an all-Afghan Taliban force comprised of more ethnic Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks, Shi'ite Commanders, dispensing peremptory exclusivity of Sunni Pashtun ethnicity. 

Hence, the Taliban 2.0 with tactical and strategic minds emerged. At the same time, the US presidents had varied approaches toward Afghanistan since 2001. The Bush administration prioritised military solutions.

The Obama administration had to balance the Pentagon, Syria, and Afghanistan. The Trump administration took a queue from President Obama and SIGAR and stepped up to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in February 2020. The Biden administration wrapped up the process. 

In August 2021, the US and other countries started their final phases of troops and people withdrawal with 31 August 2021 as the cut-off date set by the Taliban in Kabul. 

US troops leaving Afghanistan. Photo: Bloomberg

During the last withdrawal phase, as an attempt at its power projection, ISIS-Khurasan claimed responsibility for a deadly explosion at the Kabul airport on 26 August 2021. The US Central Command Chief General Kenneth McKenzie on 31 August 2021 identified ISIL-K as a challenge for the Taliban (Al-Jazeera). 

This has ensured that the troops will leave, but the US allies will maintain low visibility in Afghanistan, recalibrated US-China power-game will be coined, and "hybrid" civilian contractors backed by state-supported intelligence and drone technologies will play unique roles on the ground. 

The world is going to watch a new model of rules of engagement in the Afghan theatre. This time, the Middle Kingdom China will back the great game. The Chinese had a bitter-sweet history with the Afghan territory since the Tang dynasty in 618 CE that expanded its empire to the Western Turks in 659. 

The Turkic King of Tokharistan became its vassal making a part of China. Since then, the Afghan territory became a strategic land for China either in terms of the "silk road" or its expansion over the next centuries.

Ironically, the term "great game" was coined by a young British Captain Arthur Conolly in 1840 in his correspondence with a political agent in Kandahar. The term was mainstreamed by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim, along with Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. 

The historical anecdotes, the contemporary politics, and the future of geopolitics are all interconnected. It looks like the Afghans will have no escape from historical continuity. At least, not any time soon. 

That reminds us of a slight recasting of John Milton's indelible quote: Better to reign in hell, or to serve in heaven? The choice is open.  

Shahab Enam Khan is Professor in International Relations and Nurul Kabir is an Associate Professor in Archaeology at Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh.