Can plea bargaining work in Bangladesh's legal system?
While plea bargaining can offer efficiency and benefits to the criminal justice system, it's important to consider the potential problems that may arise as well
The criminal justice system in Bangladesh faces significant challenges in terms of backlog, delays in case resolution and overcrowded prisons. One potential solution to address these issues is the introduction and implementation of a plea-bargaining mechanism.
Plea bargaining allows for the expedited resolution of cases by negotiating guilty pleas, thus reducing the burden on the judiciary and providing defendants with the opportunity for reduced sentences.
Introducing a plea-bargaining system in any country, including Bangladesh, can have both positive and negative consequences. While plea bargaining can offer efficiency and benefits to the criminal justice system, it's important to consider the potential problems that may arise as well.
The main objective of this article is to investigate the potential and limitations of plea bargaining in Bangladesh's legal system framework, and to propose a suitable model of plea bargaining that can address the specific needs and problems of the criminal justice system.
In an ideal scenario, the legal system should provide various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for criminal cases, including plea bargaining, which is a process of negotiation between the prosecution and the defence, whereby the accused agrees to plead guilty to a lesser charge or sentence, in exchange for some concession from the prosecution.
However, the existing legal framework in Bangladesh does not provide any alternative dispute resolution mechanism for criminal cases, except for some limited provisions of confession and compromise under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Evidence Act 1872.
These provisions do not allow the accused to negotiate with the prosecution for a lesser charge or sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, which is known as plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining offers various benefits for the criminal justice system, such as saving time and resources, reducing caseload and prison overcrowding, ensuring speedy trial and justice delivery, and enhancing victim participation and satisfaction.
However, it also poses some ethical and legal dilemmas, such as compromising the presumption of innocence, impairing the right to a fair trial, lowering the quality of justice and creating opportunities for coercion and corruption.
Therefore, the introduction and implementation of plea bargaining in Bangladesh requires a careful examination of its feasibility and desirability in light of the socio-legal context and challenges of the country.
If improperly implemented, these factors could not only violate the human rights of the accused, the victims and the witnesses, but also undermine the public confidence and trust in the legal system.
To address these issues, there is a need to explore alternative ways of resolving criminal cases that can complement the existing formal judicial process.
Plea bargaining has been adopted and practised in many countries around the world, such as the United States, United Kingdom, India, and others, with varying degrees of success and controversy.
In the United States, plea bargaining has played a significant role in mass adjudication, transforming their criminal justice system into a conviction machine.
However, this has led to concerns about coercion, convicting the innocent and loss of public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system.
In the United Kingdom and India, plea bargaining is used as a mechanism for quick disposal of cases. In India, plea bargaining was introduced to bring down the number of criminal cases where the commencement of trial did not take place even after a period of three and in some cases five years.
If plea bargaining is not introduced and implemented in Bangladesh's legal system framework, the criminal justice system will continue to suffer from inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Therefore, there is a need for a suitable model of plea bargaining that can address the specific needs and problems of the criminal justice system.
The proposed model of plea bargaining must include eligibility criteria, voluntary participation, legal representation, judicial oversight, transparency, victim involvement and public interest consideration. Plea bargaining should apply to cases involving less serious offences, where the maximum punishment does not exceed a certain number of years in prison. This can help reduce the backlog of cases in the courts.
The accused should also voluntarily opt for plea bargaining, without any coercion or undue influence. This can help protect the rights of the accused.
The accused should have the right to legal representation during the plea-bargaining process. This can ensure that the accused fully understands the implications of their decision.
The court should play an active role in overseeing the plea-bargaining process. This can help prevent any potential misuse of the process.
The plea-bargaining process should be transparent, with all proceedings recorded and made available to the accused. This can help maintain public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Where applicable, the victim should be involved in the plea-bargaining process. This can help ensure that the interests of the victim are taken into account.
The court should also consider whether the plea bargain is in the public interest. This can help ensure that the plea-bargaining process does not undermine the deterrent effect of criminal punishment.
It is important to note that the implementation of plea bargaining should be accompanied by other reforms to address systemic issues in the criminal justice system. These could include improving the efficiency of the courts, enhancing the capacity of the police and strengthening the rule of law.
Zannatun Tahura is a student of the Department of Law and Human Rights at the University of Asia Pacific.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.