Public administration in Bangladesh: What to expect from reform initiatives

One of the basic pieces of knowledge that a fresher gets in the undergraduate program is that the public administration in Bangladesh has a colonial legacy. Regrettably, this is not just a factual statement but also a reflection of the current state of affairs. 

A neutral assessment of public administration in Bangladesh will decisively conclude that the condition has not changed much in the last 53 years in spite of the first massive opportunity created by the independence itself in 1971. 

Thus, it is imperative to know the basis of colonial bureaucracy, which is mainly to extract resources. For example, the British colonial powers introduced the civil service in the Indian subcontinent especially to collect revenues. 

Other features include exclusivity, a master-slave attitude, non-transparency, unaccountability, centralised authority and decision-making process, an administrative hierarchy with a strict chain of command, and weakened local government, among others. All these features suggest that colonial bureaucracy lacks a people-oriented approach. 

So, as soon as the country earned its independence, two committees were set up: the Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CARC) and the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC). Their job was to make the administration people-centered, accountable, open, professional, and free of all the vices that came from being a colony. 

Though the then government accepted many recommendations of CARC, there was no official response to the recommendations of ASRC, which recommended the constitution of a single, unified grading structure covering the whole public service. 

It is worth mentioning that this recommendation faced severe challenges, especially from the senior generalist civil servants, i.e., the senior members of erstwhile CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) and the CSP Association. The execution of ASRC's recommendations would have led to the elimination of their preferential status regarding promotions and postings, thereby creating enhanced opportunities for functional and specialist civil servants within the public service while also facilitating effective political oversight of civil servants. 

Thus, they focused on keeping the principle of exclusivity — reserving the higher echelons of bureaucracy for CSP officers. 

Given this, various regimes established as many as 15 committees and commissions to enhance the professionalism and people-oriented nature of the civil service. Among these, military dictator HM Ershad was comparatively more successful in bringing about reorganisation in civil service cadres and decentralising the functions of some government agencies by introducing the upazila parishad system. 

Regrettably, the restoration of democracy in 1991 reversed many of these reform initiatives, triumphantly reintroducing colonial bureaucratic features. 

Following the footsteps of the CSP Association, members of the civil service, especially the members of the administration cadre, put up severe challenges to all the reform initiatives from time to time. 

Additionally, the political scenario gave them the necessary leverage to diffuse political initiatives, as the ruling party relied on the support of the civil service, particularly the administration cadre, to manage the state machinery. Such leverage established the civil service, especially the administration cadre, as the dominant actor in running the state along with the ruling party. 

This dominance reached a new height during the Covid-19 pandemic when a decision was made to use the administration cadre to manage relief operations at subnational and national levels, overlooking the members of parliament. 

It was so shocking for the parliamentarians that a veteran ruling party parliamentarian sadly mentioned the issue in the parliament. It was also used to ensure the exclusivity of the administration cadre regarding promotions and postings across the civil service. 

Interestingly, in the last decade, the police cadre has become just as dominant as the administration cadre. Thus, this dominance of one or two cadres has created a disparity among the civil service cadres in terms of exercising power, promotion and posting scope, and benefits and facilities. 

Such disparity exists among the cadre and non-cadre officers as well. The civil service is also experiencing excessive contractual appointments, appointments of military officers, and political considerations in postings and promotions. 

Given this, a reform initiative in public administration does not present a rosy, optimistic picture. Despite this, the primary focus should be on recommending a public-oriented approach for the administration. To be public-oriented, there has to be a mechanism to ensure accountability and transparency in civil service management. 

For starters, appointing a secretary in a ministry can be done through merit and hearing before the relevant parliamentary standing committee. It can be an effective strategy to reduce political considerations. This hearing system can also be used for appointing the chair and members of any commission, including the constitutional ones, e.g., the Public Service Commission, Attorney General, Information Commission, Human Rights Commission, etc. 

Secondly, promotion and posting should not adhere to the principle of exclusivity. Since the members of different cadres enter the service through the same competitive examination, reserving posts for any specific cadre should not be followed. 

For instance, a tug of war is going on now between the administration cadre and the other 25 cadres on the issue of promotion to the post of deputy secretary and higher posts. At the moment, the pool of deputy secretaries is filled up following a quota of 75% for the administration cadre and 25% for all other cadres. 

This should be based on merit and open to all cadres, including the other higher posts of joint secretary and additional secretary. Additionally, top positions in professional cadres, directorates, departments, and public corporations/enterprises should be filled up within the cadre/agencies following the principle of merit. Eligible candidates should receive promotions based on their merit and performance, not their batch number. This will reduce the possibility of political considerations in promotions and postings. 

Thirdly, benefits, facilities, and privileges for all the cadres should be of the same status. For example, the loan facility for purchasing a car or flat is now available only for the members of the administration cadre, which should be extended to all cadres. 

Furthermore, performance appraisal should be ensured objectively, and it should not only rely on the reporting superior. Instead, the appraisal should broaden its scope to incorporate ratings from relevant stakeholders such as service seekers and local government institutions. Citizens' engagement as well as the involvement of local government institutions in performance appraisal will surely play a crucial role in making the civil service accountable to the people by reducing the master-slave attitude. 

Moreover, the practice of excessive contractual appointments and appointments of military officers in the civil service should be discouraged, and there should be a limit of a maximum of 1%. 

Additionally, the centralised authority and decision-making processes should be reduced through decentralisation. Authority should be delegated at the subnational level, like division and district, for making decisions. 

Also, to ensure a public-oriented, accountable, and transparent civil service, local government institutions should be strengthened. An appropriate level of autonomy should be provided to various levels of local government institutions, including the supervision of civil servants, so that the views of grassroots people can be reflected. 

Finally, the practice of democratic values and norms by the political parties within their organisation can only guarantee the practice of democracy in a country. Thus, all these expectations can only be realised effectively if there is a consensus of political commitment of concerned political parties along with the institutionalisation of democracy. 

Dr Sadik Hasan is a professor at the Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka